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The first world conference on breast 
cancer, held in Kingston, Ontario, 
in July1997, provided a unique 
opportunity for activists, concerned 
about the possible links between 
breast cancer and the environment, 
to share their concerns in an 
international forum, with 
oncologists, radiologists, 
epidemiologists, survivors and 
alternative therapists. It also clearly 
exposed the fracture lines between 
competing discourses of risk and 
responsibility, between groups 
charged with a duty to protect and 
to care - health professionals, 
epidemiologists, statutory bodies, 
and those taking on those duties - 
generally activists, from 
environmental, feminist and 
survivor groups. These lines were 
even more clearly drawn at the 
second world conference in summer 
1999 in Ottawa, particularly by the 
popular and medical media, which 
chose to stress the ‘radical’ (ie. 
‘dubious’) claims of many of the 
papers which considered breast 
cancer risks from the environment. 
The fundamental question that concerns me here is an explicitly ethical one: if we 
must act to prevent harm (and presuming for the moment the not uncontroversial 
assumption that disease is a harm), that is to say, if we are to act morally, then what 
counts as necessary and sufficient evidence to act? This, I think, is the ethical 
dimension to activism neglected or hidden in other formulations; Cuomo, for instance, 
defines activism as “conscious, purposeful, political activity” (1996:43), which seems 
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to ignore the sense of moral duty and responsibility that characterises confrontational 
activity from the margins and which I want to consider here. 
 
The social, political and cultural contexts of breast cancer activism 
 
Several features of our ‘late modern times’, and changing patterns of social 
movements, shape the context in which such moral and political activity to prevent 
breast cancer is undertaken. The first of these is a public scepticism about science and 
technology, informed by mishaps and blunders on the one hand (Yearley 1991), and 
on the other by an ideological shift as positivist methodologies have been questioned 
and found wanting (Harding 1986 and 1991). (While there is a clear differentiation 
between health/medical science and environmental/agricultural science, in the public 
mind it is the overarching, generic nature of science that prevails, whether it relates to 
rail safety, BSE or breast cancer.)  A second feature is the emergence of consumer 
rights movements, and patient advocacy groups within health care, informed by a neo-
liberalism which likes to pay at least some lip service to values of participatory 
democracy; this is the ‘normative rationale’ for public input to risk assessment, a 
pragmatic approach “predicated on an appeal to democratic principles” as advocated 
by Perhac (1998:237). A third feature is the recent history of highly effective feminist 
campaigns from the 1970s on, in which women’s skills and strategies have been 
honed, and public visibility and credibility earned (Klawiter 2000) [see photos 1 and 
2]. And fourthly, breast cancer activists have learned lessons from those working with 
HIV and AIDS in the 1980s (Epstein 1996:348; Anglin 1997:1404), whereby 
scientific knowledge and expertise were acquired and campaigning tactics refined and 
transformed. Each of these features contributes to the positioning of breast cancer 
activism as a social movement confident in making knowledge and value claims, in 
contesting the scientific establishment, and in demanding, above all, changes in policy 
to protect the public health. In this last respect I argue that breast cancer activists have 
claimed a moral authority and responsibility which remains legally invested in 
statutory and regulatory bodies - thus, incidentally, exposing a critical limitation of 
both Beck and Lupton’s formulations of the ‘risk society’, in which 'lay’ 
responsibility is legitimated only in terms of individual health behaviours. 
 
In his discussion of AIDS activism in 
the USA, Epstein (1996) notes that 
many of those involved were already 
socially positioned as ‘outside’ the 
dominant norms of society, by virtue 
of their sexuality, and familiar with 
campaigning, lobbying, organising 
and protesting within the gay rights 
movement. The story of breast cancer 
activism is not so clear cut: while 
some of those involved have a 
history of campaigning work, as 
feminists, lesbians and/or 
environmentalists, many ‘lay’ women 
researching the links between the environment and breast cancer and working for 
primary prevention, were politicised by their personal experience of the disease, by an 
urgent need to know why they had it, and by a growing concern about the potential 
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hazards in their own local 
communities [see photos 3 and 4]. 
As the photographic artist 
Matuschka asserts: “I lost a breast 
and the world gained an activist” 
(Exposure 1997; see also Rachel’s 
Daughters 1998). In this respect, 
then, such activists, new to this 
identity, are ironically positioned as 
“’hysterical housewives’ and other 
mad women”, as Seager labels 
those working in grassroots 
environmental campaigns in the 
USA (1996). As she says, “many 
women who are now environmental 
leaders were, initially, reluctant activists; most grassroots women report little prior 
community activism, little environmental knowledge, almost no experience in public 
speaking or organising; many describe themselves modestly as ‘mere housewives’” 
(ibid). The process of politicisation is an uncomfortable one: a growing distrust of 
government and corporations; anger that their health has not been protected as they 
might reasonably have assumed, but has in fact been jeopardised by environmental 
hazards; fear that this epidemic of breast cancer is not controllable [see photos 5 and 
6]. 
 
Several meetings were held in 
Canada and the USA in the early 90s 
on, bringing together women who 
saw a need, often prompted by their 
own experience of breast cancer, to 
shift the policy agenda towards more 
primary prevention (see Batt 
1994:187-209). Enquiry and analysis 
undertaken by these groups of 
women uncovered a particular 
concern about possible 
environmental causes of the breast 
cancer epidemic, and inevitably, 
then, women making those 
connections, and making them 
publicly, became identified as 
activists (Read 1995:67-77). Of 
course, this was no new story: Rachel 
Carson’s work (1962/1999) in the early1960s had already alerted us to the hazards of 
industrialised agricultural development, with its use of toxic pesticides such as DDT 
causing the ‘silent spring’ of which she warned. In the last ten years a great deal of 
other work has been done, most notably and eloquently perhaps by Sandra 
Steingraber in Living Downstream: an ecologist looks at cancer and the environment 
(1997), and specifically on breast cancer by the epidemiologist and campaigner Devra 
Lee Davis (1995; Second World Conference on Breast Cancer). In the UK, much of 
the available evidence on the links between breast cancer and the environment was 
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collated in the Women’s Environmental Network’s reference pack for the project 
Putting Breast Cancer on the Map (1998). Many aspects of our lived environment are 
implicated: I want here briefly to focus particularly on organo-chlorine pesticides, 
which have oestrogen mimicking properties as they metabolise in the bodyii (see 
Rachel’s Environment and Health Weekly #571-5, 1997, for a comprehensive 
summary of environmental factors implicated in breast cancer). 
 
Regulation and the public health 
 
In England the Pesticides Safety 
Directorate of the Ministry of 
Agriculture Fisheries and Food has 
the statutory responsibility for the 
regulation and licensing of all 
pesticides, following 
recommendations from the 
‘independent’ Advisory Committee 
on Pesticides (November 24th 
1998). The ACP states that its 
overriding aim is that “pesticides 
should be used for the public good” 
(minutes of meeting with ACP chair, 
April 5th 2000), from which we may 
infer a utilitarian approach 
emphasising the greatest good for the greatest number, not absolute protection of any 
citizen at risk. Other aims are that “nobody should be made ill by exposure to 
pesticides” and that “nobody should be made seriously ill by use of pesticides”; the 
committee does not, however, have “the legal basis to ban a particular pesticide on the 
basis that there are less toxic alternatives” (ibid). “The Directorate’s specific 
responsibilities relate to ensuring that the use of agricultural pesticides does not have 
unacceptable implications for people and the environment” (correspondence 1998). 
Clearly here, then, is an expression of a statutory remit that is congruent with what a 
common sense – or lay? – approach might assume: as an expert government body, the 
PSD has a responsibility to protect the public health, on expert advice from the ACP. 
 
The procedures by which the ACP attempts to ensure pesticides are used for the 
public good and without causing harm (classic ethical principles of beneficence and 
non-malificence) involve risk assessment measures designed to calculate acceptable 
levels of toxicity, exposure levels and daily intake, based largely on tests in animals. 
They neglect certain other factors which may be regarded as significant – synergistic 
effects, bio-accumulation, multiple exposures, public reporting of symptoms thought 
to be linked to pesticide exposure, and global environmental implications. Demanding 
a more holistic assessment that includes such considerations is a key feature of  
environmentalists’ scientific method, one which does not challenge the ideological 
basis of that approach, but rather extends it, as we shall see below. In addition, most 
epidemiological studies relate to men, as they are assumed to be the primary workers 
with pesticides; this may be the case in the over-developed world, but is certainly not 
so in less developed countries (ed. Barrientos et al 1999). The emphasis on risk from 
operator exposure is a testament to the trade union and health and safety movements, 
and their long battles for worker protection; it may, however, preclude recognition of 
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other health risks to different populations from the same substances. There is a clear 
gendered and racial bias in such a limited approach, as those active in the 
environmental justice movement have demonstrated (Fishman 2000). By focussing on 
women’s risk of breast cancer from the consumption of dairy products contaminated 
with Lindane, an OC pesticide, alongside the ignorance about its safe usage among 
agricultural workers, a Dispatches documentary (Channel 4 1996) brought these two 
conventionally divergent perspectives together, gave public prominence to the 
concerns of women with breast cancer, and called for Lindane to be banned.iii This 
approach demonstrates, I think, a popularist paradigm of risk assessment, and also 
challenges the dominant positivist basis to scientific enquiry exemplified by the 
methods adopted by the ACP, by demanding action on the basis of existing 
knowledge and compatability with regulations in place elsewhere in the world. 
 
The uncertainty of scientific knowledge and the moral imperative 
 
A defining feature of this paradigm, and of the demands of environmental activists 
more broadly, is the ‘precautionary principle’, articulated by Davis (1995), Batt 
(1994), Read (1995), Simpson (2000), Steingraber (1997), Epstein (1997), inter alia, 
and heartily endorsed by the International Global Action Plan (First World 
Conference on Breast Cancer 1997) that came out of the first world conference. As 
Steingraber states, “the precautionary principle…dictates that indication of harm, 
rather than proof of harm, should be the trigger for action – especially if delay may 
cause irreparable harm" (1997). The frustration of many activists, expressed at the 
conference and in the British campaign to ban Lindane, is with the reluctance of 
policy makers to acknowledge that we know enough, that the “weight of evidence is 
sufficient” (Second World conference on breast cancer 1999). The precautionary 
principle demands that policy makers act as though they were certain. In terms of the 
tradition of public health policy, this is nothing new: “we must act on facts, and on the 
most accurate interpretation of them, using the best scientific information. That does 
not mean we must sit back until we have 100% evidence about everything. Where the 
state of the health of the people is at stake, the risks can be so high and the costs of 
corrective action so great, that prevention is better than cure” (Horton 1998:251). In 
the case of tobacco use, they sat back too long; in the case of preventing the 19th 
century epidemic of cholera in London, action was taken on the available, limited 
evidence, and the understanding of the spread and prevention of the disease greatly 
enhanced – as well as lives saved. 
 
The moral imperative of the precautionary principle in risk assessment thus manifests 
an explicitly deontological principle that requires action to prevent harm, rather than 
the consequentionalist position adopted by the statutory ‘protection’ agencies. The 
precautionary principle is a response to the explicitly ethical issues that activists 
identify: a perceived injustice in terms of the moral failure of government and 
industry to protect health, a sense of the equal human worth of all those ‘at risk’, and 
a conviction of the moral responsibility to act to change the conditions which are 
believed to threaten the health of our communities. 
 
In asserting that “we never have enough proof”, but that “dead bodies should not be 
the requirement to act to prevent breast cancer” (Davis in Exposure1997), the 
precautionary principle emphasises the “inherent uncertainty of science” (ibid). While 
subverting a fundamental tenet of the scientific paradigm, such an approach is not, 
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however, a challenge to science per se, as activism may be caricatured, for still we 
need scientific enquiry and the resultant evidence in order to test hypotheses and to 
shape conclusions and policy action. As Evelleen Richards is quoted as saying (in 
Epstein 1996:343), we need “’to learn to live with the reality of uncertainty’ and to 
introduce political, ethical and subjective criteria” into scientific processes. Of course 
the critique of the dominant positivist method shows clearly just how such criteria are 
implicit in so-called objective, unbiased and value-free scienceiv; Richards’ proposal 
is for the legitimation of such criteria as the basis for policy making for the public 
good. The political criteria employed by activists’ analysis of the environmental risks 
of breast cancer are crucial to the understanding of the broad picture of disease they 
advocate. This includes, for instance, a powerful critique of the vested interests of ‘the 
cancer industry’ – characterised by corporations such as Zeneca (Klawiter 2000), a 
$8.6 billion international biosciences business, involved in the complete cycle of 
breast cancer through a pesticide and he rbicide division, ownership of a chain of 
cancer care centres in the US, and the manufacture of the world's largest selling breast 
cancer drug tamoxifen. Many other examples might be cited, but not in a paper of this 
length and focus. 
 
 
‘Lay’ and ‘expert’ knowledge claims  
 
Such considerations provoke a lack of trust in ‘experts’, which, according to Beck 
(1995:126), is in the nature of the ‘risk society’ we inhabit; he seems, however, to 
overlook the mutual and reciprocated nature of that mistrust. In order to challenge the 
status quo of the breast cancer industry’s priorities, activists have learned fluency in 
the languages of science: of epidemiology, biochemistry, human biology  (see 
Klawiter 2000; WEN 1998 and 1999; Second World Conference on breast cancer 
1999). Their appraisal of the published data on pesticides and breast cancer uses the 
same skills of critical analysis of the evidence presented as any ‘good’ scientist, but 
the legitimacy of ‘non-experts’, and ‘lay’ knowledge claims are perceived as biased 
and devalued by the political, ethical and subjective criteria implicit in their 
conclusions. Lupton observes (1999:86) that “Foucault, like Beck and Giddens, 
emphasises the role of expert knowledges in the constitution of late modern 
subjectivity…[which] are seen as pivotal to governmentality, providing the guidelines 
and advice by which populations are surveyed”. What actually seems to be the case is 
that the subjectivity of the experts is the key factor here, rather than the status of their 
knowledge. By virtue of their proximity to science, and thus to that hierarchical 
esteem invested in science since the post-Enlightenment modernisation of the world, 
their knowledge is imbued with more status than that of equally knowledgeable 
activists or lay people. Thus it is that authority, not the facts – the knowledge claims - 
and, by extension, the legitimated basis of regulatory policies and practices, that are 
challenged when ‘lay expertise’ contests the evidence and conclusions cited by the 
institutions of power and government (see also Wynne 1997; Abraham and Sheppard 
1997). 
  
Some campaigners clearly think that such legitimacy may be granted to all and any 
lay persons, as evidenced by the WEN information pack given to all women who 
might participate in Putting breast cancer on the map (1998): “To make this project 
work we are asking you to be the researcher. You already possess all the skills, 
knowledge, experience, enthusiasm and local knowledge (sic) necessary to achieve 
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this. You also have a vested interest in yourself, your community and your 
environment.” The basis of these claims is a wholly different discursive position, one 
which derives from a particular feminist epistemology: the authority of women as 
good-enough experts, and the validation of a ‘vested interest’ (Harding 1991). While 
many breast cancer activists clearly have an acquired expert status within a traditional 
scientific paradigm,v their knowledge claims derive not solely from their assessment 
of those ‘facts’ of potential hazards, but from a differently constructed subjectivity, as 
women at risk of breast cancer (Potts 2000:123-4; Epstein 1996:347). Thus while, as 
we saw, the legitimacy of the knowledge claims of the ‘scientific experts’is invested 
in their identity qua scientists, the moral legitimacy of ‘lay experts’ or breast cancer 
activists may be understood to be invested in their identity based on an embodied 
knowledge, which rests in the personal risk to the self of breast cancer.  
 
Such 'subjective' criteria beg the whole vexed question of the relationship between 
emotion and science, a polarity of positions that on the one hand still characterises 
activists as ‘too involved’ and therefore too partial, in every sense ( see Harding 
1991:109 for a full discussion of this point), and on the other hand expressly 
legitimates that local, intimate, first hand embodied knowledge that women may have: 
as Nancy Evans, a breast cancer activist in the Bay Area of California states, “we are 
the body of evidence” (Second World Conference on Breast Cancer 1999). Such 
acquired and embodied ‘expert’ knowledge is based in opposition to the established 
claims of risk assessment made by statutory and regulatory bodies; it is grounded in a 
discourse which acknowledges the validity of the explicit inclusion of the personal 
and ethical. Activists, then, move between these discursive positions, learning 
scientific method and analysis while also asserting an personal/embodied/ethical 
standpoint. The ‘cognitive praxis’ (Eyerman and Jamison 1991) of the breast cancer 
and the environment movement thus also reflects this ‘bifurcated consciousness’ 
(Smith 1988).  A similar effect has been identified by Fosket in relation to women’s 
knowledge claims about the treatment of breast cancer; as she states, “women can be 
seen as occupying this critical position of bifurcation and constructing knowledges 
that reveal the spaces that exist between…biomedicine…and those knowledges that 
are meaningful to the lives of women” (Fosket 2000:31). I do not wish to ascribe an 
enhanced or special status to these experience based knowledge claims; they are not, 
as Gruen states (1994:129), transparent; they “…give no direct or immediate access to 
‘facts’”, and nor do they have an intrinsic authority or legitimacy, as Fuss (1989) has 
shown.  But their inclusion in risk assessment would make for stronger science, not 
‘bad’ science.  
 
 
Alliance for change 
 
What, then, might be ‘good enough’ science in this context? An oral claim by Friends 
of the Earth that the WEN report (1999) on the perceived environmental risk of breast 
cancer is ‘bad science’ because its conclusions are loose, woolly and unspecific, is 
premised on a positivistic “cognitive science perspective” (Lupton 1999), embraced 
by many environmental organisations in the quest for legitimacy and recognition. 
Such criticism echoes Mulkay’s review of Misunderstanding Science (1997:257), in 
which he implies ‘lay experts’ are doing ‘bad’ science by not being immune to bias – 
a statement of the obvious, but not, as I hope I have shown, necessarily one that 
should be blameworthy. For if we acknowledge with Harding (1991:145) that any 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 2, No. 3  June 2001
 8
objectivity in science is a myth, that all knowledge is situated and all knowers are 
different (Cheney 1994:168), then we can validate as a ‘stronger objectivity’ a 
scientific paradigm that expressly locates the (moral) agents in the making of 
knowledge claims about risk. Such an approach evokes Gruen’s notion of “an 
ecofeminist moral epistemology … (that) results from the recognition of the 
interdependent nature of science and society, reason and emotion, facts and values” 
(1994:134). This would be a process of risk assessment informed on the one hand by 
standpoint theory and nicely incorporating Lupton’s synthesis (1999a; 1999b) of 
existing approaches, while legitimating the value claims of activists too, made as 
moral agents with relevant embodied knowledge. In this way a changed paradigm of 
risk assessment and regulation could provide Harding’s “possibilities for a 
transformed, socially just science”( Rocheleau 1996:3). 
 
In order to ‘stop breast cancer before it starts’, a slogan adopted by the UK 
campaigning group ‘free rrradicals’, to protect future generations of women from 
environmental risks, we need urgently to establish a different basis for regulatory 
practices; as Cheney suggests, “our real concern … is with the relationship of people 
variously positioned, those not socialised to the same set of theoretical vocabularies. 
Under what conditions would they agree on a world-story?” (1994:168; emphasis in 
the original). The work of breast cancer activists is informed by such considerations, 
and thus has the potential to transform, rather than overthrow, professional scientific 
endeavour, and to invest it with appropriate ethical concern, for the health of women 
and the health of the planet. The ACP would likely be astonished by demands for a 
‘stronger objectivity’ in their risk assessment procedures, but as Cheney (1994:168) 
makes clear, the “matter of negotiating reality, and with it, values”, is a logical 
outcome of such an alternative position. Peggy Reynolds, a formidable breast cancer 
activist and environmentalist from the Bay Area in California articulated this position 
with characteristic verve: “We are not waiting for these studies to be complete; we 
need these studies, yes, but they’re not going to be done in my life time…or even in 
my grand-daughter’s…we’re not waiting any more; we’re going for action. ‘Do no 
harm’, that’s what it really translates to, the Hebrew phrase to ‘repair the world’ – 
that’s what we’re trying to do…We were given a place that’s got a little messed up. 
We have a responsibility to work to clean it up. As Bella (Abzug, erstwhile president 
of WEDO) said, ‘we are the ones we’ve been waiting for (Second World Conference 
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ii In recent years I have personally been involved in campaigning to ban Lindane in the UK; this has 
involved direct action, lobbying and participation in public forums. As an organic gardener I have been 
committed to non-harmful cultivation for twenty years, and first undertook research in this area when I 
worked in health promotion from 1984. 
iii In the UK, a network of groups actively campaigns has been very successful in campaigning for a 
ban on Lindane, in line with European Union directives; UNISON, a public sector trade union, 
Pesticides Action Network UK, Women’s Environmental Network, Breast UK , Green Network, and 
free rrradicals are all involved. Current activity focuses on Lindane in chocolate (from cocoa grown 
mainly in Africa), and extending the ban to cover all domestic use products. 
iv Concern remains about the outside interests of members of the ACP; several hold academic/research 
positions funded by pharmaceutical companies. 
v But as Epstein makes clear, while the democratisation of biomedical knowledge-making is clearly a 
good for society, it is not without problems (1996:351). The problem of ‘expertification’ within social 
movements certainly bedevilled the Women’s Health Movement, causing what Epstein calls 
“knowledge hierarchies” that “build upon and reinforce social cleavages based on other markers of 
difference – class, formal education, race, gender, sexuality, and nationality” (ibid:352). 
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